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Due to several recent highly publicized information breaches, information security has gained a higher profile. 
Hence, it is reasonable to expect that information security  would receive an equally significant emphasis in the 
education of future systems professionals. A variety of security standards that various entities (e.g., NIST, COSO, 
ISACA-COBIT, ISO) have put forth emphasize the importance of information security from the very beginning of the 
system development lifecycle (SDLC) to avoid significant redesign in later phases. To determine the emphasis on 
security in typical  systems analysis and design (SA&D) courses, we examine (1) to what extent security is 
emphasized in the core SA&D courses and (2) at what phase in the SDLC do most SA&D courses begin to 
emphasize security. In order to address these questions, we reviewed SA&D textbooks currently on the market to 
identify how extensively they cover security-related issues. Given the fairly high awareness of information security in 
practice, we expected to see an equally high emphasis on such matters in the textbooks. However, our review 
suggests that this is not the case, which suggests a gap in our preparation. To address this gap, we offer a proposal 
for modifying a portion of the SA&D curricula. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Businesses, governments, and other institutions serve their respective constituencies today in an age of ever-
increasing global connectivity and integration, which is facilitated by the information infrastructure that the Internet 
provides. Open standards and protocols enable easy communication among enterprises of all stripes, including 
those governmental organizations that oversee commerce activities (Salisbury, Miller & Turner, 2011). With the 
advent of big data and cloud-based computing, organizations are increasing their online presence, and data 
volumes continues to grow rapidly. 
In this environment, scarcely a week can pass without news of a security breach occurring that exposes sensitive 
information of a significant number of individuals (cf. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2013). Such breeches allow 
non-authorized individuals to alter data or render a given system unavailable to its legitimate users. In late 2013, it 
was revealed that Target  suffered a breach that exposed sensitive information from customers (cf. Eversley & 
Hjelmgaard, 2013). The troubled 2014 roll-out of the Healthcare.gov site has also featured significant gaps in the 
website’s security posture (Whitney, 2014). Outcomes such as these are increasingly likely in a world where more 
and more valuable information resources are placed in systems that have any number of identifiable vulnerabilities 
in an environment replete with threat agents that are increasing exponentially in terms of their motivation, 
sophistication, and willingness to attack. The seriousness of these issues was made clear by the massive Sony 
breach of 2014, which involved the release of significant amounts of personally identifiable information (e.g., actors’ 
and employees’ social security numbers) and intellectual property (e.g., complete movies, scripts) (cf. The 
Economist, 2014). As such, it seems reasonable that firms are increasingly paying attention to information security; 
in fact, a variety of major U.S. firms (e.g., John Deere, JP Morgan-Chase, PepsiCo Inc.) have sought chief 
information security officers (CISO) and other credentialed security personnel (Damouni, 2014). 
The intersection of valuable information assets online, vulnerabilities in systems, and threat agents with intent and 
capability are the components of information risk (Figure 1). As vulnerabilities are discovered and more dangerous 
threats are identified, information assets’ exposure to risk naturally increases (U.S. Department of Defense, 2000; cf. 
Dutta & McCrohan, 2002). We should clarify that what we describe here is not “risk” as is often viewed in the system 
development literature (which focuses on the risk of failures in the development effort), but risk to the information 
assets for which systems are developed in the first place. This is an important distinction because at least one 
European organization suggests that appropriate risk management principles are not effectively applied when the 
topic turns to cyber-risks (Graham, 2013). Given the current threat environment, it should not be surprising that the 
risk to data and systems has become increasingly visible. 
One plausible explanation for why these sorts of breaches are becoming near universal is that systems development 
practices and methodologies may not yet have caught up with the realities inherent in systems that are connected 
globally and always on, always connected, and always available. This situation is analogous to problems that 
occurred when information systems did not have appropriate validity checks specified in their requirements and, 
subsequently, were built into implemented systems. For example, consider the occurrence of unreasonably high bills 
or account balances as in the case of an extraordinary water bill for $4,704.88 (Neumann, 1995) or a phenomenal 
checking account balance of $924,844,208.32 (Neumann, 1996). Systems development practices are more likely to 
avoid these errors today. It is now common to include validity checks, such as reasonableness and range tests, 
when specifying requirements, whereas such controls were not necessarily specified when manual systems were 
first converted to computer-based systems. We suggest that similar attention should be applied to concerns 
regarding the security of organizational information, and that, at this writing, it appears this is often not the case.  
A variety of organizations have promulgated security standards for organizations (see Table 1 for a sample). This 
said, at the heart of any discussion regarding information security stands the importance of three basic 
requirements: confidentiality (i.e., only those with appropriate privileges should see restricted information), integrity 
(only those with appropriate privileges should be able to modify restricted information) and availability (all individuals 
with appropriate privilege should have ready access to restricted information) (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2004a; cf. ISACA, 2012). These requirements are often referred to as the CIA triad (cf. Perrin, 2008). 
Other perspectives on security exist: for example, consider access control via identification, authentication, and 
authorization (Zviran & Erlich 2006), or authentication, authorization, and accounting (cf. de Laat, Gross, Gommans, 
Vollbrecht, & Spence, 2000). CIA is an over-arching perspective that includes these as a means of achieving the 
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three basic information security requirements. Given the broad focus and widespread recognition of CIA, we use the 
NIST standards with CIA as a basis for our discussion that follows. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk Viewed as the Intersection of Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Valuable Information Assets 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2000) 
 
Hence, one way to assess the validity of our explanation described above for the prevalence of security breaches  
would be to investigate the extent to which systems professionals’ education prepares them to address the CIA of 
data and systems. A growing consensus in the security field suggests that security planning should be a prime 
consideration even in the earliest phases of system development (cf., National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2004b), which the system development lifecycle (SDLC) represents. Systems analysis and design 
courses are central to IS curricula, and the IS 2010.6 standard for systems analysis and design suggests developers 
should “incorporate principles leading to high levels of security…from the beginning of the systems development 
process” (Topi et al., 2010, p. 51). Thus, it’s relevant to assess the extent to which this is true in courses where 
systems professionals learn what to do during the SDLC, particularly the early stages. Typically, relevant courses in 
MIS curricula for developing system professionals are systems analysis and design courses. 
 
 
 
 
  
340 
Volume 36 Article 18 
Table 1: Sampling of Organizations with Some Emphasis on Information Security Risk 
Management 
Standard Sponsoring organization Organizational website 
COBIT ISACA isaca.org 
NIST U.S. Federal Government csrc.nist.gov 
COSO Treadway Commission coso.org 
ISO/IEC International Standards Organization iso.org 
ITIL Information Technology Infrastructure Library itil.org 
FERMA* Federation of European Risk Management Associations ferma.eu 
Note: FERMA as an organization is focused on risk more broadly, of which cyber risk is one part. 
 
In this paper, we examine the extent to which information security is included in the teaching of university systems 
analysis and design courses. More specifically, we review relevant artifacts to develop an initial answer to our 
question: that is, we closely examined the textbooks most commonly used to teach systems analysis and design 
(SA&D) courses. We do not assert that MIS faculty use only these sources; however, we do assert that examining 
the content of widely adopted SA&D texts enables an initial assessment of the emphasis on information security in 
typical SA&D courses. Because the various security standards generally cover the same ground, we first outline one 
of these standards with widely available (free and online) prescriptions relevant to the system development lifecycle 
and compare its precepts with the material on security in several well-known systems analysis and design texts. The 
results should assist in understanding the extent to which information security is or is not included in the texts, and, 
by extension, what is actually emphasized when security-relevant material in systems analysis and design texts is 
taught. Additionally, we also examine at what point in the SDLC is security introduced in current systems analysis 
and design texts. 
To preview our findings, our results suggest that the material on security included in SA&D textbooks is somewhat 
limited and focuses typically on the SDLC’s later stages. Indeed, one could strongly suggest that this material is, as 
it stands, inadequate to address the concerns raised in either the security standards or in practice. We conclude by 
discussing our findings and offering suggestions for how this situation might be remedied.  
II. STANDARD WE CHOSE FOR REVIEW 
We began by reviewing one of the commonly known standards for information security (at least in the US): the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) special publications 800 series of documents, which describe 
security policies, procedures, and guidelines. The 800 series was established in 1990 to provide q separate identity 
for IT security publications (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007) and covers topics such as cloud 
computing (800-145 and 800-146), risk management (800-37), mobile phones and PDA security (800-124) and 
clearing storage media of sensitive information (800-88). We point out that, while NIST standards were developed by 
and for the U.S. Federal Government, they are quite consistent with other standards covering similar topics (e.g., 
ISACA, 2012; Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, 1992; Cartlidge et al., 2007) and are often applied in the 
private sector. Further, security certification regimes (e.g., International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium (ISC2)), often draw from these standards in setting certification examinations, and there is significant 
isomorphism in the relevant standards (e.g., COBIT and NIST both emphasize CIA; indeed, CIA is part of the COBIT 
definition of information security; cf. ISACA, 2012). 
We found the most relevant NIST standards for our particular exercise include NIST 800-37 Revision 1 (Guide for 
Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach), NIST 
800-39 (Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission and Information System View) (National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, 2011), NIST 800-30 (Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments) (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2012), and NIST 800-64 Revision 2 (Security Considerations in the System 
Development Life Cycle) (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008c), so we use these for our 
assessment.  
Taken together, the standards we review here provide guidelines for applying an integrated framework for risk 
management when developing information systems in organizations. This includes security categorization, security 
control selection, implementation, assessment, and monitoring. The underlying emphasis of the NIST standards is 
on managing information system security risks in a manner consistent with a given organization’s mission, business 
objectives, and overall risk strategy, which is accomplished by ensuring necessary security controls are integrated 
into enterprise architecture and SDLC processes to encourage the use of appropriate risk-management strategies 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010). 
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Importantly, the NIST risk-management framework assumes that information technology and information assets are 
among organizations’ most valuable assets. Of significance to a comprehensive security program is the notion of 
return on security investment (ROSI) (cf., Mehan & Krush, 2009). To ensure that ROSI is achieved (i.e., that the 
most valuable assets receive the highest level of protection) and that inappropriately large sums are not spent on 
protecting assets whose value does not justify the expense, it is critical that organizations correctly appraise the 
value of various information assets they need to protect. Organizations own critical assets they need to protect; 
should those assets be breached, the organizations will suffer accordingly. Further, organizations operate in a space 
where there are known threat agents with some degree of sophistication, motivation, and resources that they could 
use to attack defenses surrounding these critical information assets. Finally, organizations have a wide range of 
possible vulnerabilities (e.g., unpatched systems, etc.) that may be present in their systems.  
Estimating risk begins with characterizing a system, which involves documenting such things as its purpose, scope, 
functions, boundaries, and information processed (Howard, 2013). Characterizing can be a fairly involved exercise, 
depending on the complexity of the system and the nature of the information being processed. However, similar 
assessments are done routinely as part of the SDLC, wherein the project scope, feasibility, operating environment, 
description of the proposed system (including types of information to be processed, and available inputs to, and 
required outputs from, the system) and other managerial issues are initially assessed (cf., Hoffer, George, & 
Valacich, 2014). When an organization understands the value of its information assets, it has access to the basic 
information required to begin categorizing the information system it needs; that is, it can assess what impact a 
breach in confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of organizational information would have, which it can express 
in terms of its mission, reputation, and/or finances. The organization can then assess its assets’ values, threats, and 
vulnerabilities (and, as a consequence, risk) as described in NIST 800-64.  
Obviously, assessing risk means first weighing the value of the information to be processed and the impact that 
would result from a breach. Information in a system can be mapped to various information types processed as 
described in NIST 800-60 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008a; 2008b) (which is in the initiation 
phase of the SDLC). Table 2 summarizes the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and the 
potential impacts if these were breached; with this in hand, one can evaluate the importance of, and therefore 
appropriate level of controls for, one’s information assets. 
Table 2: Security Objectives and Impact Definitions from FIPS 199 (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 2004a) 
 Potential impact 
Security objective Low Moderate High 
Confidentiality 
Preserving authorized 
restrictions on 
information access 
and disclosure, 
including means for 
protecting personal 
privacy and 
proprietary 
information. 
The unauthorized disclosure 
of information could be 
expected to have a limited 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized disclosure 
of information could be 
expected to have a serious 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized disclosure 
of information could be 
expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect 
on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
Integrity 
Guarding against 
improper information 
modification or 
destruction, which 
includes ensuring 
information non-
repudiation and 
authenticity.  
The unauthorized 
modification or destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a limited 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized 
modification or destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a serious 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized modification 
or destruction of information 
could be expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
Availability  
Ensuring timely and 
reliable access to and 
use of information. 
The disruption of access to 
or use of information or an 
information system could be 
expected to have a limited 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The disruption of access to 
or use of information or an 
information system could be 
expected to have a serious 
adverse effect on 
organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
The disruption of access to or 
use of information or an 
information system could be 
expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect 
on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or 
individuals. 
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The assessed security impact categories (low, moderate, high) have implications for system development and 
acquisition. Once an organization knows that valuable information is in play, it can review threats and vulnerabilities 
to better understand the risk level, for which NIST 800-30 (Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments) is useful. 
Conducting a risk assessment involves identifying threats (sources and events), vulnerabilities and predisposing 
conditions (e.g., constraints on information handling, technology requirements, environmental concerns), likelihood 
of occurrence, and likely impact (see Table 2).  
From reviewing various NIST publications, we developed three key understandings, which are consistent with other 
security standards (e.g., those in Table 1). First, security should be a key part of the SDLC from the point of system 
initiation because adding security controls later in the SDLC (after the system architecture is fairly complete) in the 
form of patches would be expensive, perhaps prohibitively so (cf. Boehm, 1981). Second, specifically identifying 
goals for information confidentiality, integrity, and availability early on during the SDLC is important. From these 
goals, one can derive appropriate controls to implement an acceptable level of security in a cost-effective manner. 
Third, information systems should be categorized in the initiation phase (cf., National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2004a, 2004b) of the SDLC (Table 3). This means assessing the impact (e.g., a low, moderate, or high) 
in terms of disrupted operations, financial losses, or loss of life that a breach of confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
would have were it to occur (see Table 2). The system is then designed and built/bought with this security 
categorization in mind while security controls are selected and built into the system in later phases. In other words, 
attention to information security needs to be an integral element of the SDLC from the earliest phases so that it is 
incorporated into every aspect of information system development, which is consistent with the IS 2010.6 for SA&D 
courses.  
One can assert that a focus on security early in the SDLC is particularly appropriate for systems that will be 
functioning while attached to the Internet, which is to say the vast majority of new systems being built. While the 
Internet is a tremendous resource for facilitating organizations and individuals to connect, the design of its 
architecture has significant limitations that create serious concerns regarding security. To wit: 
While the Internet represents a robust global information system, one needs to recall that it was originally 
devised with an emphasis on availability (i.e., the network and relevant information should be available to 
those with legitimate need). Confidentiality (i.e., that a given store of data should only be seen by those with 
legitimate authority or privilege to do so) and integrity (i.e., data should be changeable only by those with 
legitimate authority to do so) were not emphasized in the design of the Internet. When the network was 
exclusively the domain of government, this may have been acceptable. However, with the opening of the 
infrastructure to the world at large, and given the sensitivity of the data transmitted and criticality of the 
systems it supports, concerns about these vulnerabilities are now rising to the forefront. Further, the 
openness of the architecture itself creates vulnerabilities that may lead to denial of availability (e.g., through 
DDOS attack). When these vulnerabilities come into contact with those who may not share the same beliefs 
about “appropriate” use and who may have reason to do harm, these concerns become even more salient. 
(Salisbury et al., 2011, p. 298) 
With this understanding, we focused on reviewing textbooks, which we discuss in Section 3.  
III. SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT OF TEXTBOOKS 
From reviewing three NIST standards documents, we created a rubric to review texts that are commonly used in 
systems analysis and design classes. The rubric (see Table 4) first identifies the text, followed by some descriptive 
information (viz., number of chapters and pages). Next, we used the rubric to assess (as surrogates for each 
textbook’s precedence of security) the earliest SDLC phase in which it the textbook indicates that security 
requirements should be taken up, whether or not the CIA triad is discussed (as a surrogate for emphasis on 
security), and whether security is seen as a functional or non-functional requirement. We also noted any security 
standards we found referenced in the texts. We put any insights not readily fitting one of our headings in the 
comments column. 
We generated an initial, short list of texts by consulting faculty who teach the SA&D course at our university. We 
then contacted authors and publishers to flesh out our list: we asked them for the latest editions of the main 
textbooks on our list and for the names of any titles we missed. Finally, we submitted an earlier draft of our 
manuscript to the each textbook’s authors for their comments, and presented it at a conference to obtain further 
feedback. Table 4 lists the books we reviewed, along with what we believed to be relevant security attributes. 
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Table 3: IT Security in the SDLC as Described in NIST 800-64 (NIST, 2004c) 
 Initiation Acquisition / 
development 
Implementation Operations / 
maintenance 
Disposition 
S
D
L
C
 
 Needs 
determination: 
 Perception of a 
need 
 Linkage of need 
to mission and 
performance  
 Objectives  
 Assessment of 
alternatives to 
capital assets  
 Preparing for 
investment 
review and 
budgeting 
 Functional 
statement of need  
 Market research 
 Feasibility study  
 Requirements 
analysis  
 Alternatives 
analysis 
 Cost-benefit 
analysis  
 Software 
conversion study 
 Cost analysis 
 Risk management* 
plan  
 Acquisition planning 
 Installation 
 Inspection 
 Acceptance 
testing 
 Initial user 
training 
 Documentation 
 Performance 
measurement 
 Contract 
modifications 
 Operations 
 Maintenance  
 Appropriateness 
of disposal 
 Exchange and 
sale  
 Internal 
organization 
screening 
 Transfer and 
donation 
 Contract 
closeout 
S
E
C
U
R
IT
Y
 C
O
N
S
ID
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S
 
 Security 
categorization 
 Preliminary risk 
assessment 
 Risk assessment  
 Security functional 
requirements 
Analysis 
 Security assurance 
requirements 
Analysis  
 Cost considerations 
and reporting 
 Security planning  
 Security control 
development 
 Developmental 
security test and 
evaluation 
 Other planning 
components 
 Inspection and 
acceptance 
 Security control 
integration  
 Security 
certification  
 Security 
accreditation 
 Configuration 
management 
and control 
 Continuous 
monitoring 
 Information 
preservation  
 Media 
sanitization 
 Hardware and 
software disposal 
* Risk management in this context refers to risk associated with the development and not computer security or system technical 
risk. 
 
Because there is variance between texts in terms of the number of SDLC phases, we decided to “normalize” all of 
the textbooks we assessed around the NIST five-phase SDLC framework (see SDLC phase column in Table 4). We 
list the lifecycle phase each textbook follows, in brackets, by the corresponding NIST phase. We believe that this 
enables us to make reasonable assertions across the range of texts. While we adopted NIST as an organizing 
scheme for our brief review, we also reviewed the texts for mention of any of the other security standards or any 
tenets of information risk management (e.g., information criticality/sensitivity, threat assessment, vulnerability 
assessment, control assessment). We also reviewed the textbooks’ indices and their detailed tables of contents. 
Where we found terms that led us to believe it possible that security was being discussed, we reviewed the content 
on those and adjacent pages. 
While we primarily used NIST for our review, for our purposes, we could have adopted any of the fairly well-known 
standards (e.g., COBIT, COSO, etc.) because each includes various means by which information security risk can 
be assessed and then mitigated by using of various controls. Our concern is not with which standard is being used; it 
is whether any standard is being extensively used in SA&D texts to identify the criticality of information assets and, 
depending on this assessment, specify appropriate and cost-effective requirements for controls in proposed systems 
early in the SDLC.  
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Table 4: Texts and Assessments 
SDLC phase (text 
(NIST)) security first 
indexed in (page)? 
C
IA
 t
ri
a
d
 
d
is
c
u
s
s
e
d
?
 
Security 
standards 
mentioned 
Security 
control 
Other comments 
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
N
o
n
-
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
Hoffer, J. A., George, J. F., & Valacich, J. S. (2014). Modern systems analysis and design (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Prentice Hall. (14 chapters, 526 pages) 
Page 13 in the 
overview; in terms of 
SDLC in design/ 
acquisition (acquisition/ 
development) 
(p. 335).  
No 
COBIT 
ITIL 
Microsoft 
SDL 
 
X 
Introduces Microsoft security development lifecycle in introductory chapter on SA&D 
environment. Discussion of security in terms of information security (integrity) in the 
context of the SDLC occurs later in the book with the mention of data integrity. 
Security also discussed in implementation and testing. COBIT and ITIL noted in 
discussion of data integrity. 
Kendall, K. E., & Kendall, J. E. (2014). Systems analysis and design (9th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.: Pearson Education. (16 chapters, 
518 pages) 
Analysis (acquisition/ 
development)  
(p. 193).  
No 
None 
(ISO 
mentioned 
but seems to 
reference 
usability 
standards 
and the 
UNICODE 
character 
set.) 
 
X 
Security focus in the analysis phase is somewhat limited, though the need for secure 
applications, security in the cloud, BYOD, and security when working with SaaS 
providers (as examples) are discussed. Authors discuss the importance of something 
analogous to system categorization as early as page 88. However, they appear to 
separate security planning from SA&D: they describe security planning as “a project in 
and of itself and must be managed as such…” (p 88). Security partitioning appears to 
be the primary focus on security as we might view it. Integrity constraints are 
discussed with database design. The major discussion of security, including privacy 
and disaster recovery, is near the end of the book in the context of quality assurance 
and implementation (chapter 16).  
Rosenblatt, H. J. (2014). Systems analysis and design (10th ed.). Boston: Course Technology Cengage Learning. (12 chapters, 668 
pages) 
Systems analysis 
(acquisition/ 
development) (p. 132) 
Ye
s 
ISO 
 
X 
Security is very briefly defined as early as page 132. CIA triad appears to not be 
discussed in terms of overall lifecycle, appearing near the end of the text (pages 524-
542), in a section on security and risk management (discussed after implementation). 
ISO mentioned on pages 389 and 451-452. 
Dennis, A., Wixom, B. H., & Roth, R. M. (2015). Systems analysis and design (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. (Note: online 
version reviewed) (14 chapters, 472 pages) 
Requirements 
determination 
(acquisition/ 
development) (p. 108) No 
PCI 
HIPAA 
ISO 
 
X 
The importance of identifying non-functional requirements (security being one of 
these) is noted fairly early as something that will affect decisions in the design phase. 
Security controls are discussed on page 249 (chapter 8); PCI, HIPAA and ISO 
compliance are also discussed in this general area; however, these appear more as 
something mainly to make operations staff aware of potential risks. Topics such as 
encryption, certificate authorities, and virus protection are described as well, and 
appear in the section “Architecture design”. 
Dennis, A., Haley Wixom, B., & Tegarden, D. (2012). Systems analysis and design with UML version 2.0: An object-oriented approach, 
4th ed., Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (Note: A new edition is anticipated in 2015). 13 chapters, 592 pages) 
Requirements 
determination 
(acquisition/ 
development) (p. 113) 
No 
COBIT 
HIPAA 
ISO 
 
X 
Relevant legal mandates (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley) noted as important to consider. ISO 
9000 and COBIT noted briefly on page 113; access controls are discussed on page 
464, encryption and authentication are described on pages 500 and 501; virus 
protection on page 503.  
Satzinger, J. W., Jackson, R. B., & Burd, S. D. (2015). Systems analysis and design in a changing world (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Course 
Technology/Cengage Learning. (14 chapters, 484 pages) 
Requirements 
(acquisition/ 
development) (p. 46) 
No 
  
X 
CIA not specifically described as such but fairly extensive discussion of security and 
integrity controls appear in Chapter 6 (Foundations for Systems Design).   
Valacich, J. S., George, J. F., & Hoffer, J. A. (2015). Essentials of Systems Analysis & Design (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Pearson Education. 
(10 chapters, 418 pages) 
Design/acquisition 
(acquisition/ 
development) (p. 202). 
No 
  
X 
Relatively short book; security not discussed much; briefly in analysis, and design and 
again in implementation and testing. Data integrity is discussed, but mainly in terms of 
input validation and processing controls.  
Whitten, J. L., & Bentley, L. D., (2007). Systems analysis and design methods (7th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. (20 chapters, 747 pages) 
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Table 4: Texts and Assessments 
SDLC phase (text 
(NIST)) security first 
indexed in (page)? 
C
IA
 t
ri
a
d
 
d
is
c
u
s
s
e
d
?
 
Security 
standards 
mentioned 
Security 
control 
Other comments 
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
N
o
n
-
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
20/ 
747 
Initiation 
(initiation)  
(p. 19) 
No 
  
X 
Security is briefly discussed (three paragraphs) in the introductory chapter. The focus 
is on business continuity in the event of breach or disaster and on privacy. It is also 
noted in the third chapter in a figure listing potential system problems. Data integrity 
discussed in chapter 14 (database design). Another discussion (six paragraphs near 
the end of the text) focuses on authentication and authorization in user interface 
design.  
IV. FINDINGS 
Interestingly, the majority of these SA&D textbooks do not place much emphasis on security. Instead, they often only 
cursorily mention it, and at least one textbook doesn’t introduce it until the acquisition or even the implementation 
phase, by which time it may be extremely difficult to implement effective security controls without prohibitive cost (cf., 
Boehm, 1981). Another interesting finding is that only one of the books we reviewed directly mentions the concepts 
of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, although at least one other made mention of concepts that would have 
similar meaning. 
One text (Valacich et al., 2012) appears to specifically mention security three times, all in the implementation and 
testing phase (note: implementation as described by NIST), though this text does also discuss data integrity as a 
concern. This was a fairly common theme among the majority of books. In instances where security was mentioned, 
it is typically featured toward the middle to latter portion of the SDLC, even in books that do emphasize the 
importance of security controls: 
Sometimes, the analyst is concerned about events that are important to the system but do not directly 
concern users or transactions… During analysis, the analyst should temporarily ignore these events…At this 
stage, the analyst should focus only on the functional requirements. …Most of these physical system events 
involve system controls, which are checks or safety procedures put in place to protect the integrity of the 
system. …These controls are important to the system, and they will certainly be added to the system during 
design. (Satzinger et al., 2015, p. 79) 
Another text in our sample singles out the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, COBIT, ISO 9000, and capability maturity model as 
topics that affect the functional and nonfunctional requirements in the requirements determination portion of the 
systems analysis process. The textbook states: 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, mandates additional functional and nonfunctional requirements. 
These include additional security concerns (nonfunctional) and specific information requirements that 
management must now provide (functional). When developing financial information systems, information 
system developers should be sure to include Sarbanes-Oxley expertise in the development team. (Dennis et 
al., 2012, p. 113) 
Further, another textbook discusses security as non-functional requirements: 
The IIBA (International Institute of Business Analysts, Guide to Business Analysis Body of Knowledge) 
defines (nonfunctional requirements) as 'the quality attributes, design, and implementation constraints, and 
external interfaces which a product must have.' Although the term 'nonfunctional' is not very descriptive, this 
requirement category includes important behavioral properties that the system must have, such as 
performance and usability…. Nonfunctional requirements are primarily used in the design phase when 
decisions are made about the user interface, the hardware and software, and the system’s underlying 
architecture. Many of these requirements will be discovered during conversations with users in the analysis 
phase, however, and should be recorded as they are discovered. (Dennis et al., 2012, p. 107) 
These particular texts raise issues that at least suggest an emphasis on security fairly early in the SDLC, although 
this is more toward the notion of seeing security as a non-functional requirement and regulatory compliance (e.g., 
Sarbanes-Oxley) rather than focusing on a risk management perspective as pertains to information security. In fact, 
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one text does assess the potential for information risk and impacts on confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
explicitly, although the primary focus on this was found toward the latter part of the SDLC (cf. Rosenblatt, 2014).  
Another item that we noticed when assessing current SA&D textbooks against NIST standards is that disposition of 
obsolete or uninstalled hardware and software does not appear to be discussed even in passing. This is something 
that should be at least mentioned in that archival of important data and disposal of hardware have implications for 
confidentiality and availability. Indeed, Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) demonstrate this in a clear fashion in their study 
of disk sanitization practices: they obtained disposed-of hard drives from a variety of sources and checked to see 
whether they still contained readable data, and found that approximately one third of the drives contained 
confidential information that should have been erased prior to disposal.  
V. DISCUSSION 
One of the key points of divergence between the NIST standards we reviewed and the majority of SA&D texts is a 
lack of emphasis on understanding information risk (see Figure 1), particularly confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability issues associated with a system early in the SDLC. Put simply, many texts do not see assessing the 
impact of a breach as an important step early in the SDLC. Further, we found fairly limited discussion of specific 
end-of-lifecycle activities that may be important to ensure information confidentiality, such as destroying records 
(although Kendall and Kendall (2014) note media shredding (or media sanitization) (as discussed in NIST 800-88) 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014). 
Although not found across the board, a couple of newer books discuss information security as we focus on it. For 
example, Rosenblatt (2014) explicitly discuss CIA. And, in their discussion of the systems development environment, 
Hoffer, George, and Valacich’s (2014) discuss the notion of the Microsoft security development lifecycle, which was 
not in the previous edition. We applaud their introducing this into the discussion, in particular their emphasis on 
having “security become part of the development process from the beginning and not suddenly appear at the end of 
the SDLC”. While this is important, note that the presentation of this perspective and methodology appears to focus 
on developing secure products, which would clearly be a concern for a software developer, rather than developing 
systems (as one example) for a bank that is looking at threats to the CIA of its own information assets and the 
potential impacts (e.g., financial, legal, reputational) to that organization in the event of an information breach. 
Given limited evidence of the importance of security in SA&D textbooks, one implication of our effort suggests that 
security needs to be elevated both in emphasis and precedence in the SA&D course. For example, authors and 
instructors in systems analysis and design courses often categorize requirements into functional (something the 
system does) and non-functional (something the system is required to have—constraints) (cf. Satzinger et al., 2012). 
The distinction between functional and non-functional requirements is consistent with an approach to systems 
development that emphasizes understanding what the system is required to do before designing how it should meet 
the requirements. The intent of the distinction is not to imply that non-functional requirements are less important or 
should receive less attention than functional requirements. Our findings indicate, though, that this distinction clearly 
focuses more attention during requirements analysis on functional requirements, which do not typically include 
security in textbooks used to teach systems analysis and design. 
Although security has traditionally been characterized as a non-functional requirement, some research suggests that 
security should, in some instances, be viewed as a functional requirement, in particular with respect to inter-
organizational systems (cf., Baskerville, Rowe, & Wolff, 2012). Baskerville et al. challenge the assumption that there 
is necessarily an inverse relationship between security and functionality (in particular in inter-organizational systems 
that require integration) and identify environmental dynamism as a key moderator of this relationship. 
This identification of security as a functional requirement also seems particularly appropriate for systems that require 
security functions. For especially sensitive types of information (e.g., social security and financial or medical 
records), we assert that security is, by definition, a functional requirement since security functions must be met 
before any other functions may be performed. Indeed, certain systems cannot legally operate (i.e., perform any 
functions) in the absence of security protections for the confidentiality and integrity of personally identifiable 
information. The impact of a breach of confidentiality, integrity, or availability (assessed in accordance with 
appropriate security standards) would also seem relevant. In environments in which a breach of one or more of 
either confidentiality, integrity, or availability would have moderate or high impact, one could assert that the 
operating environment of an associated information system is “dynamic”, to apply the term that Baskerville et al. 
(2012) use. 
We did not collect data indicating whether similar differences in attention occur in practice. As such, we cannot 
discuss whether the functional vs. non-functional distinction should be re-examined in light of more rapid 
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development approaches that blur the difference between analysis and design phases; however, other papers could 
focus on this topic1. 
Returning to the notion of system risk factors, the interrelated nature of systems and the advent of the Internet may 
mean that vulnerabilities and threats cannot be readily assessed, which makes risk less definable. One could readily 
assess the impact of a breach, but may not be able to readily assess the threat environment or perhaps even 
vulnerabilities. This is even more of a concern due to many-to-many relationships between users and systems. 
Indeed, the potential for breach of data confidentiality, integrity, and availability involving these systems that have no 
apparent interrelationship was made clear in a dramatic fashion by the experience of Matt Honan, a technology 
writer for Wired magazine. Mr. Honan’s misfortune was caused in part by the fact that he used both Amazon and 
Apple iCloud services. Information (viz., the last four digits of a credit card number) deemed non-sensitive by 
Amazon turned out to be values that Apple used as identity verification. By working back and forth between Amazon 
and Apple, hackers were able to access his iCloud account and assume control of all his Apple digital devices 
(Honan, 2012). 
The issues raised here will become only more relevant with the advent of “bring-your-own-device” (BYOD) initiatives 
(cf. Office of the President, 2012; Kendall & Kendall, 2014), wherein employees are enabled to use their own 
smartphones, laptops, and other devices at work. This, of course, implies that entry points into various systems will 
be necessary, which exposes various systems to a wider range of threats due in no small part to vulnerabilities 
present in these devices. The use of devices that are portable feature operating systems with updates controlled by 
third-party telecommunications carriers and that are often taken into non-controlled environments and sometimes 
lost will create an ongoing challenge for identifying, quantifying, and controlling for risks to information security 
(Kopytoff, 2012). 
More aggressive digitization of various extant systems (e.g., the “smart” utility grid or electronic health records) will 
also lead to a greater need to assess impact of information breaches and put appropriate controls in place. For 
example, a report from the U.S. Office of the Inspector General (cited in Clune, 2011) found a lack of IT security 
controls during audits at Medicare contractors, state Medicaid agencies, and hospitals in several U.S. states. This is 
troubling given the sensitivity of the information contained in health records. To remedy a breach or vulnerability in 
these settings after the fact would be quite expensive. For another example, there are growing concerns surrounding 
the control devices for industrial systems (cf., Larkin, Lopez, Butts, & Grimaila, 2014), which include power-
generation facilities. The impact of a breach of integrity or availability in these sorts of systems would be problematic 
(Salisbury et al., 2011), and the cost of after-the-fact remedies again would be prohibitive. Hence, considering 
impact in a manner analogous to that suggested by NIST standards during system development would seem 
appropriate. 
These issues noted, there is some movement toward enhancing the emphasis on security throughout the SDLC. 
The International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC2), a well-known not-for-profit that 
specializes in information security education and certifications, offers a certified secure software lifecycle 
professional (CSSLP) certification (cf. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008d), which places 
significant weight on public standards, such as NIST, that emphasize designing systems for security throughout their 
lifecycle. Other certificates offered by ISC2 include the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), 
one of the more advanced and comprehensive security certifications. Other standards and standards organizations 
mentioned here feature similar foci. 
VI. CHALLENGES FOR INTEGRATING THESE CONCEPTS INTO SA&D PEDAGOGY 
Clearly, we believe that we have identified a disconnect between the importance of information security in practice 
and its importance in material used to prepare information systems practitioners. Information security is of critical 
concern in practice and yet core SA&D courses in the MIS field seem to have limited interest in this topic, and, 
indeed, place little emphasis on information security early in the SDLC.  
We do not wish to be overly critical: SA&D courses already have a very full plate, and it is reasonable to assert in 
this light that our recommendations in Tables 5a and 5b are ambitious, to put it mildly. However, it is not only SA&D 
courses that are full, but the curriculum of many IS programs. At our university, the MIS major is (along with 
accounting) generally the fullest in terms of required classes required for completion. We are inclined to believe that 
our university is not an anomaly in this matter, especially given that the IS 2010 model curriculum (Topi et al., 2010) 
suggests that the typical AACSB-accredited North American business school would have 24 credit hours in the 
information systems core and electives. The major at our university currently has 27 credit hours, which includes the 
                                                     
1 Our thanks to Stephen Burd (co-author of one of the reviewed texts) for raising this issue. 
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business school core IS course IS 2010.1. Hence, it seems important to take great care before advocating the 
position that we simply need another course. Students at our university can take an elective on security (with content 
similar to what is suggested in the IT audit and IT risk management electives from IS 2010), but they can also satisfy 
their electives (6 credit hours) with other courses. 
While we primarily hope to raise awareness about the limited emphasis on information security, we offer some 
suggestions that may be useful to integrate this content more readily into SA&D courses. With the concerns we have 
noted, we submit that a possible answer already lies in some of our earlier discussion on these matters.  
First, we revisit the SDLC model advocated in NIST 800-64 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2008c). 
As we note earlier, the model proposed in 800-64 advocates a fairly early focus on understanding the security 
implications with respect to information and data proposed to be processed by an anticipated system. Given that the 
vast majority of the necessary knowledge about these matters should already be captured as part of system 
development, it seems to us a relatively straightforward matter to include system characterization, system 
categorization, and risk assessment as learning content to be adopted from the beginning of the SDLC, which would 
be consistent with the learning objective from IS 2010.6 that security principles should be incorporated from the 
beginning of the SDLC. Controls are already covered reasonably well, so the only changes there would be to map 
the importance of the information assets onto appropriate controls to protect these things.  
Second, we believe that information security and risk management should be a focus of SA&D textbooks (and 
courses) from the beginning of the SDLC. This is consistent both with IS 2010.6 and with good practice as Boehm 
(1981) describes; leaving something this important to the latter stages of the SDLC invites a lack of necessary 
emphasis and leaves open the potential for expensive rebuilding of system elements.  
At this point, we note that many of the topics we mention here are discussed in the elective IT audit and security and 
risk management courses from IS 2010 (which refer to ISACA and COBIT); the course we currently offer at our 
university covers these topics, too. There is coverage of these topics in the data and information management, IS 
strategy, enterprise systems, and infrastructure courses, too, though we assert that this is limited. However, we 
believe that security is no longer something that can be seen as a minor component or as elective, and many of the 
topics currently seen as part of an IT audit course should receive significant attention in courses comprising the IS 
core. Further, if systems are going to eventually be audited given certain standards, it would seem reasonable to 
suggest that they be built with those standards in mind. As such, we propose that incorporating CIA assessment, 
requirements specification, and design specification into IS curricula be directed at the systems analysis and design 
course in the 2010 standard IS curriculum (IS2010.6). As the standard curriculum (Topi et al., 2010) specifies, this 
course is primarily focused on analyzing and documenting business requirements and on converting these 
requirements into detailed systems requirements and high-level design specifications (e.g., mock-ups of forms, 
reports, HCI, and other user interface components), not on internal design or system implementation design.  
Tables 5a and 5b show course objectives, topics, and proposed security coverage for major SDLC phases 
emphasized in this course. We use the three SDLC phases from Table 3 related to SA&D courses, except that we 
split acquisition/development into the two phases (i.e., analysis/functional requirements specification and logical 
system design). Several IS2010.6 objectives and topics are not based on any specific SDLC phase. Instead, they 
involve pre-project activities, such as clearly defining problems, opportunities, or mandates that initiate projects and 
identify opportunities for IT-enabled organizational change. They also cut across SDLC phases such as “manage 
information systems projects using formal project management methods” and “fundamentals of IS project 
management in the global context”. Thus, we identify these objectives and topics in Tables 5a and 5b as spanning 
multiple phases in the SDLC (see footnotes in these tables). We note that the only security-relevant objective that 
we identify as spanning multiple phases is the following broad statement about both security and user experience: 
“incorporate principles leading to high levels of security and user experience from the beginning of the systems 
development process”. Only one topic related to security is included in the topics for IS 2010.6; a sub-topic in 
analysis and specification of system requirements.  
The part of the broadly stated objective related to security is consistent with our proposal; however, IS2010.6 
provides limited further guidance. Thus, we provided more specific proposals for security-relevant content (including 
some elements drawn from NIST 800-64, the NIST pamphlet “Information Security in the SDLC” and other sources) 
in the appropriate SDLC phase in Tables 5a and 5b. The reader will note that we have also included for 
consideration NIST 800-64 phases “operations/maintenance” and “sunset (disposition)” as shaded columns. 
Operations/maintenance is the portion of the lifecycle wherein the system is functioning and performing its intended 
tasks; it has traditionally been considered as part of the SDLC (e.g., Hoffer, George and Valacich, 2014) and we 
included it here. Sunset (disposition) refers to the steps whereby the transition occurs from one system to another; 
while one could assert that this would simply reflect the beginning of the SDLC for a new proposed system, the 
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SDLC as presented in the SA&D books we reviewed does not appear to offer guidance with respect to the 
information extant in a current system, but which must be preserved in any new system. We believe this more rightly 
falls under what NIST refers to as the sunset, (or disposition) phase. This reflects our belief that there should be an 
introduction, at least at a rudimentary level, to the notion of preserving and protecting organizational information 
throughout the SLDC, given the importance both of providing accurate information to decision makers without 
distortion and maintaining the confidentiality of organizational information assets. This perspective arguably appears 
lacking in current SA&D curricula.  
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Table 5a: Learning Objectives 
Initiation Acquisition / development    
Initiation Analysis-functional 
requirements specification 
Logical system 
design 
Implementation Operations / 
maintenance 
Sunset 
(disposition) 
IS2010.6 learning objectives  
 Understand the 
types of business 
needs that can be 
addressed using 
information 
technology-based 
solutions. 
 Initiate, specify, 
and prioritize 
information 
systems projects 
and to determine 
various aspects of 
feasibility of these 
projects. 
 Clearly define 
problems, 
opportunities, or 
mandates that 
initiate projects. 
 Incorporate 
principles leading 
to high levels of 
security and user 
experience from 
the beginning of 
the SDLC. 
 
 Use at least one specific 
methodology for 
analyzing a business 
situation (a problem or 
opportunity), modeling it 
using a formal technique, 
and specifying 
requirements for a 
system that enables a 
productive change in a 
way the business is 
conducted. 
 In the context of the 
methodologies they 
learn, write clear and 
concise business 
requirements 
documents, and convert 
them into technical 
specifications. 
 Use contemporary CASE 
tools for the use in 
process and data 
modeling. 
 Articulate 
various 
systems 
acquisition 
alternatives, 
including the 
use of 
packaged 
systems (ERP, 
CRM, SCM, 
etc.) and 
outsourced 
design and 
development 
resources. 
 Compare the 
acquisition 
alternatives 
systematically. 
 Design high-
level logical 
system 
characteristics 
(user interface 
design, design 
of data, and 
information 
requirements). 
 Learn how to 
implement 
information 
systems in 
organizations in 
organizations using 
various alternative 
methods. (Note: 
this isn’t 
specifically 
mentioned in the 
IS 2010.6 learning 
objectives, but 
various topics that 
would seem 
relevant to this are 
listed there).  
Operations/maintenance and sunset 
(disposition) are phases not addressed 
in IS2010.6 but are suggested by NIST 
documentation on information 
security. Maintenance activities are 
discussed in the IS 2010 elective IT 
audit course. We found limited if any 
guidance on system disposition.  
Additional security-relevant learning objectives that NIST 800-64 suggests 
 Understand 
potential impacts 
from breach of 
confidentiality, 
integrity or 
availability of 
information assets. 
 Learn how to 
assess risk and 
perform security 
categorization. 
 Document security 
requirements and 
convert these into 
specific security controls 
based on the value of 
information assets. 
 Design 
procedures for 
securing 
information 
assets. 
 Learn how to assess 
IS security controls 
and ensure that 
they are part of the 
ongoing operation 
of the system. 
 Learn how 
to devise 
and put into 
place plans 
for the 
secure 
ongoing 
operation of 
information 
systems. 
 Learn how to 
develop a 
systematic 
procedure for 
secure system 
disposal 
 Understand the 
importance of 
maintaining 
information 
security, and 
information 
preservation in 
system transition 
Note: The following learning objectives are not necessarily associated with any specific SDLC phase and are considered here as such. From IS 
2010.6, these are: manage information systems projects using formal project management methods; incorporate principles leading to high 
levels of security and user experience from the beginning of the SDLC; analyze and articulate ethical, cultural, and legal issues and their 
feasibilities among alternative solutions; communicate effectively with various organizational stakeholders to collect information using a 
variety of techniques and to convey proposed solution characteristics to them. Those suggested by NIST 800-64 include: understand the 
importance of establishing and maintaining information security, and information preservation throughout the SDLC.  
* NIST phase “acquisition/development” split into two for consistency with the majority of SA&D books. 
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Table 5b: Topics 
Initiation Acquisition / development*    
Initiation Analysis-functional 
requirements 
specification 
Logical system 
design 
Implementation Operations / 
maintenance 
Sunset 
(disposition) 
IS2010.6 topics (high-level categories only) 
 Identification of 
opportunities 
for IT-enabled 
organizational 
change. 
 Analysis of 
business 
requirements. 
 Analysis of 
project 
feasibility. 
 Structuring of 
IT-based 
opportunities 
into projects. 
 Project 
specification. 
 Project 
prioritization. 
 Analysis and 
specification of system 
requirements (note: 
includes “factors 
affecting security”). 
 Impact of 
implementation 
alternatives on system 
requirements 
specification. 
 
 
 Different 
approaches to 
implementing 
information 
systems to support 
business 
requirements. 
 Specifying 
implementation 
alternatives for a 
specific system. 
 Methods for com-
paring systems 
implementation 
approaches. 
 Organizational 
implementation of 
a new information 
system. 
See comment in Table 5a. 
Additional security-relevant topics that NIST 800-64 suggests 
 Develop specific 
confidentiality, 
integrity and 
availability 
requirements. 
 IS security 
categorization. 
 Risk assessment 
 Security planning. 
 Security functional 
requirements analysis. 
 Security assurance 
requirements analysis. 
 Impact of security 
control requirements 
on system 
requirements 
specification. 
 Cost considerations 
and reporting for 
security. 
 
 Risk assessment 
 Design security 
controls. 
 Select initial 
baseline of 
security 
controls, then 
refine. 
 Security 
planning. 
 Security control 
development. 
 Security control 
integration. 
 System & 
component 
inspection & 
acceptance. 
 Security 
certification. 
 Security 
accreditation. 
 Configuration 
management. 
 Continuous 
monitoring. 
 Security 
Auditing. 
 Intrusion 
detection & 
monitoring. 
 Contingency & 
Continuity 
plans. 
 Transition 
planning. 
 Hardware & 
software 
component 
disposal. 
 Media 
sanitization. 
 Information 
preservation& 
archiving. 
Note: The following topics are not necessarily associated with any specific SDLC phase and are considered here as such. From IS 
2010.6, these are: business process management; fundamentals of IS project management in the global context; using globally 
distributed communication and collaboration platforms; different approaches to systems analysis and design: structured SDLC, unified 
process/UML, agile methods. Those that NIST 800-64 suggest include: tools, techniques, and controls to establish and maintain 
information security; and information preservation throughout the SDLC. 
* NIST phase “acquisition/development” split into two for consistency with the majority of SA&D books. Therefore, some topics span 
more than one phase. 
  
 
While we focus on the SA&D course, there is probably a larger issue that should be addressed: that is, the treatment 
of security in MIS curricula. Security is introduced mainly in introductory MIS courses, but, at times, it is lost in later 
courses due to the understandable need to focus on the technical details of actually getting students to learn things 
such as process and data modeling, SQL, basic programming control structures, and so on. The IS 2010 model 
curriculum mandates “significant coverage” for the topic areas of IT security/risk management and IT audit/controls 
for a single proposed career track, labeled information auditing and compliance specialist. Significant coverage of 
either topic applies to a limited number of proposed career tracks, not including business analyst or project manager 
(Topi et al., 2010). Hence, while topics relevant to security do indeed receive some small mention in various model 
course descriptions, some rethinking may be necessary regarding how to thread security more readily throughout IS 
curricula, rather than having it reside in a stand-alone course (as is the case currently at our university and likely 
others) or be featured only as minor additions to the requirements of some courses (e.g., SA&D or databases).  
  
352 
Volume 36 Article 18 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This study is an initial attempt to understand the extent to which information security, which has received increased 
emphasis in practice in recent years, is emphasized in system development courses. Specifically, we focused on the 
importance of information security in teaching SA&D courses. As such, our study has some limitations. First, note 
that we looked at only texts in this study, not course syllabi. This said, textbook publishers go to fairly great lengths 
by using focus groups, faculty reviewers, and other means to be certain that their texts have content that faculty wish 
to see included. Hence, the texts may be seen at the least as a reflection (albeit with some distortion) of what faculty 
want to teach. 
Certainly, we re-emphasize that we are not overly critical of existing SA&D texts or their authors. Textbook authors 
tend to write books that reflect the market and its expressed interests as reflected in adoptions. Further, both 
textbook authors and faculty often face significant time constraints, which may lead to certain topics being dropped, 
even important ones. It is understandable that the texts as a group cannot focus heavily on information security 
given that (a) security has been universally viewed as a non-functional requirement to date, (b) addressing security 
concerns along with everything else that needs addressed adds complexity to an already full SA&D course agenda, 
(c) thinking about security requirements as espoused here is fairly recent, and (d) authors and faculty have time and 
space constraints. With textbooks, as with knowledge, there is evolution in play that will hopefully lead to a greater 
emphasis on these topics in the future; we hope our effort accelerates an increased and earlier emphasis on 
information security in the textbooks used to develop systems professionals. 
Even though we used NIST standards in presenting our findings, other relevant standards that we referenced earlier 
are not terribly distinct from NIST standards. All of the standards emphasize the bedrock importance of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. They also have some means by which the importance of information is 
assessed along with the salience of threats and vulnerabilities (which, along with the value of the information asset, 
comprise risk). In addition, they emphasize building security controls into information systems commensurate with 
the value of information assets and the risk to them. Our concern is not that SA&D materials, represented by the 
texts we reviewed, are not using NIST per se; our concern is that, as our findings suggest, a significant portion are 
not addressing these issues in any effective manner, which makes it plausible that a majority of faculty delivering 
SA&D courses are not either. 
At this writing, we have not yet researched this topic with those working in industry, although one of the authors 
found that the primary thesis of this article resonated with attendees when it was presented at a practitioner 
conference in 2013. Obviously, this paper is a first effort toward getting a better handle on how security is viewed in 
the system development life cycle, and perhaps in IS curricula writ large. 
We also suggest that the issues we raise here may not be limited only to the SA&D courses. It seems reasonable to 
assess courses in MIS curricula to determine the extent to which courses emphasize the CIA triad. We believe that 
most courses in IS curricula feature a distinct lack of emphasis on such matters. For instance, how is security 
included in textbooks and teaching materials in database management coursework? Noted security expert Bruce 
Schneier (2000) has stated that “security is a process, not a product”, which implies that security should be featured 
when developing information systems, throughout their life, and that it should be practiced as a matter of routine 
both in IS departments and the organizations for which we build systems. We are unsure at this point as to whether 
this is the case. 
Note that the vast majority of examples we provide here to illustrate risk are almost solely limited to the threat of 
malicious agents. Security preparation must necessarily be seen in the context of not only malicious action, but also 
human error and natural accident. However, for our purposes here, these distinctions are not particularly crucial. 
Risk comprises the value of the information being processed, vulnerabilities in one’s systems, and the threats that 
exist to that information. The specific types of controls that should be put in place will change depending on the 
nature of the threat, but our main point (that greater emphasis and precedence should be placed on information 
security in the SDLC) does not. 
We think that it’s clear that our systems analysis and design courses could benefit from a greater emphasis on 
information security. Further, to avoid costly rework and/or missed security requirements resulting in system 
vulnerabilities that may well lead to breaches of confidentiality, integrity, or availability, the security requirements of 
information systems should be considered earlier and throughout the system development lifecycle, which is 
consistent with the position advocated by NIST. In addition to assessing development risks during the SDLC, it is 
important to categorize the impact of information security breaches over a system’s life. Understanding the issues 
involved in protecting information assets is an important perspective that appears to be lacking in the core MIS 
curricula for teaching future systems professionals. We suggest that it would be instructive to both textbook authors 
and faculty to revisit the emphasis placed on information security in teaching systems analysis and design courses. 
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We present our admittedly ambitious suggestions for such an emphasis in the spirit of engendering further 
discussion.  
We intend our effort here to establish a basis to "call" IS educators to address what we perceive as a gap pertaining 
to information security as required content in the preparation of future MIS professionals. SA&D courses are 
arguably essential in information security preparation for IS professionals since students should presumably learn 
the appropriate foundation to (1) analyze information security requirements for a system and (2) design the system 
to meet those requirements. Without some such preparation from SA&D courses that use any of the relevant 
standards noted here (NIST, COBIT, COSO, ISO, ITIL, FERMA), IS professionals are likely missing foundational 
elements for meeting organizations’ information security needs. We believe that our assessment provides 
persuasive evidence that there is a problem with information security preparation in SA&D courses and call on our 
colleagues in academia to address this concern.  
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